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Suffering: Challenge to Faith, Challenge to God i 
 
Alice L. Eckardt 
 
Evil and suffering have always been, and doubtless always will be, subjects of great 
concern not only to their victims but to any system of thought that postulates a good creator or a 
purposeful universe. Attempts to explain them are many.ii The problem with explanations is that 
all too often they put the burden on the sufferers: Either it is their fault (even if no one, except 
God, knows exactly what sin or wrongdoing has been committed by them or their predecessors!). 
Or it must be endured because it somehow fits into the divine scheme. Explanations become part 
of theologies that seek to assign positive value to reality. Thus justification is provided and an 
ethic of suffering is created. Yet we instinctively sense that something is not only wrong but evil 
in that process though we desperately want to believe that such suffering ultimately serves some 
good purpose. Are we still satisfied to rely on such hope? Elie Wiesel’s answer is primarily No 
(as are some others’ responses). 
 
The 20th and 21st centuries have seen inordinate suffering deliberately and cold-
bloodedly inflicted on millions of humans – not only in the Shoah but in countless other 
situations around the globe. Without minimizing any of the suffering in other cultures, we in the 
Western hemisphere need to pay particular attention to what has been done within our own 
communities. Since that history has been predominantly Christian, Christians are called on to test 
their ideals, theology, and professions of faith in light of the historical consequences to which 
they contributed. The same history has to be a primary concern for Jews as well since so much of 
their past experience has been at the hands of the Christian world, and most of their present 
existence and future hope lie within Western societies. 
 
Suffering as redemptive and its function as an ethic: 
One of the primary ways by which the problem of evil and suffering has been approached 
is to go beyond attempted explanation and ask more directly whether suffering has some kind of 
positive function in the process of redemption, and if so, how.iii  
 
Judaism’s bases for asserting some role for suffering are rooted in the Binding of Isaac, 
the martyrs of Maccabean, Hadrianic, and later times, the Sacrifice (actual) of Isaac, and the 
Thirty-Six Just Ones of every generation.iv  
 
Christianity’s arguments for redemptive power in suffering are rooted primarily in Jesus’ 
sacrificial and atoning death, although a number of similarities between the sacrifice of Jesus and 
the sacrifice of Isaac were elaborated on by the Church Fathers. Thus the Akedah was seen as a 
prefiguring of Golgotha. Thus Isaac was the “prototype for the sufferings and trials of Jesus”; 
Isaac carried the wood for the sacrificial pyre just as Jesus bore his cross; Isaac was the sheep for 
the burnt offering and Jesus was the lamb slain for others, even as the Paschal lamb.v   
 
But Augustine spelled out for the church the absolute uniqueness of the Christ event as an 
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ineradicably necessary and revolutionary “reversal of human history.”vi Thus the church 
celebrated the suffering of God’s new people as a faithful witness to God’s truth as embodied in 
 
 Christ and his church, and as a faithful witness to Christ’s power to save.vii  But it perceived the 
suffering of the unfaithful ones – the people of the “old” covenant – as nothing less than 
deserved punishment for their “hardheartedness and unbelief.” Their suffering verified for 
Christians that God had indeed rejected His former people.In this way the theme of the suffering 
of the righteous was turned into a weapon against the Jewish people who had originated both the 
concept of righteous suffering and the deed of martyrdom, and who continued to die (at least in 
their own view) as witnesses to God. Moreover, adding insult to injury, Christian persecutors 
often interpreted Jews’ voluntary martyrdom as connivance with the devil.viii 
 
With considerably more reason Jews also turned the concept of the suffering of the 
righteous against the faith of their Christian adversaries. During the persecutions and massacres 
of the 10th  to 14th  centuries Jews viewed their own martyrdom as sacrifical suffering on behalf 
of the true faith whereas the religion whose representatives were forcing this choice on them was 
seen not only as false but also as contemptuous.ix 
 
Responses to Shoah Suffering: Jewish: 
Since the suffering of the people Israel as part of God’s “secret aim” of transforming the 
world had become the recurrent theme of Jewish writings from the Middle Ages on, particularly 
at times of intense Jewish suffering , it is not surprising to find that during and even after the 
Shoah it continued to be expressed in some circles. Rabbi Hirschler, who died in Mauthausen in 
1943, is reported to have said, “To us [Jews] the world is like a crucible into which God plunges 
us in the course of time because we have forgotten him and have not respected his laws, perhaps 
for our purification, perhaps for a sacrifice of atonement for the salvation of others. [Therefore,] 
it may be right and beautiful to suffer beyond one’s own sins.”x Notice, however, the lack of 
certitude with which he propounds the traditional views, a diffidence that only partially hides his 
unspoken questions. 
 
On the other hand, Rabbi Elchonon Wasserman restated the theme of atoning sacrifice 
with more assurance at the very moment when he and others awaited execution at the Ninth Fort 
outside Kovno on July 6, 1941. He spoke to his fellow Jews as follows: “It would seem that in 
heaven we are considered Tzaddikim (righteous). For atonement is to be made with our bodies 
for Klal Yisroel. As we do Teshuvah (repentance) we should [be concerned] with saving [the 
souls of] the Shearith Israel (the saving remnant). . . . We now carry out the greatest Mitzvah, 
Kiddush HaShem (good deed, sanctification of the Name of God). The fire which will burn our 
bodies is the fire which will resurrect the Jewish people.”  Wasserman’s brother-in-law Rabbi 
Chaim Ozer Grodzensky  (Achiezer) of Vilna saw Torah and faith as supplying the means to 
endure the suffering, turn the catastrophe back, and bring redemption. For both of them the 
churban had “a positive meaning: the more evil, [the more] punishment, [then] the closer the 
redemption. Each moment of cosmic catharsis, of suffering, is a moment of messianic entry into 
history.” Interpreting events from the midrashic perspective, they saw all of the actors in the 
drama as “instruments of God’s plan to transform history.”xi 
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As we will see, Elie Wiesel rejects this view. 
 
But in these rabbis’ views the negative side of the scenario had less to do with Israel’s 
vicarious suffering for the world and was directed at Israel’s suffering for its own sins: for its 
abandonment of Torah in favor of secular ideologies, its assimilation with non-Jewish cultures, 
and its nationalistic Zionism. Writing in the Fall of 1939, after the pogrom of Kristallnacht and 
at the beginning of Polish Jewry’s agony, Rabbi Wasserman held that the punishment fitted the 
crimes. However, he assured Jews, once the nation was purged of these evils, remembered its 
real identity and returned to Torah, the catastrophe would be turned back. In fact, persecution 
ultimately is Israel’s salvation because God searches out the persecuted.xii 
 
Rabbi Issachar Shlomo Teichtal of Budapest in late 1943 came to a quite contrary 
conviction regarding the cause of the extreme suffering. It was opposition to political Zionism 
that indirectly contributed to and compounded the tragedy of European Jewry. The very purpose 
of the suffering was to be a stimulant to the Jew in galut to return to the Land and his true Jewish 
self. Still, for Teichtal also, suffering could be the “prelude to redemption,” the beginning of 
tikkun (mending), by shattering defective reality.xiii 
 
After the war Rabbi Ignaz Maybaum in England also dared to speak of a constructive 
outflow from the horrors of the Shoah, and the vicarious nature of Jewish suffering. By God’s 
“severe decree” (gezeirah) the history of mankind had been thrust into a new age. The old 
obstructions to progress and community were now removed, specifically, the medieval Christian 
dogma that outside the church there is no salvation, and the medieval Jewish Codes that “worked 
on the principle: outside the din, you cannot be a Jew.” Now “Jew and Christian meet as equals. . 
. .” The third churban (the Shoah) makes possible “messianic progress,” just as the two earlier 
gezeirot did. 
 
Maybaum was driven to find some such meaning in the 20th century destruction because 
he “refused to consider the possibility that Jewish history was devoid of meaning.” For the Jew, 
“Auschwitz is the great trial. The Jew is tried, tested, like Abraham at Moriah,” but the faithful 
remnant will pass the test. There was no doubt for Maybaum but that the six million “died an 
innocent death; they died because of the sins of others. Western man must, in repentance, say of 
the Jew what Isaiah said of the Servant of God: ‘Surely, our diseases he did bear, and our pain he 
carried . . . he was wounded because of our transgressions, he was crushed because of our 
iniquities’ (53:4, 5).” Maybaum insisted that “Jewish martyrdom explains the meaning [of this 
passage of Isaiah] . . . better than the medieval Christian dogma [of the cross] ever did.”xiv 
 
Some Orthodox survivors living and writing in the Munich area in the years 1945 to 1948 
were convinced of the uniqueness of the churban even while they saw it aligned with Jewish 
history. For them (as for Wasserman and Grodzensky) assimilation to modernity and 
abandonment of Torah were the root causes of the terrible suffering and annihilation. In other 
words, it was not God’s fault but the people’s. But Torah could not be destroyed for it is eternal 
and transnatural; and it offers Jews resurrectibility and survival. Still, Torah-history now required 
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a nation state. Eretz Israel offered dignity and life while galut meant spiritual slavery and death. 
In fact, for Benzion Firer “the galut mind-set of passive suffering and of obedience to orders 
[even] until death itself” was shattered by the Warsaw Ghetto’s revolt. The fighters were 
asserting national self-consciousness and freedom. Their purpose was to shatter despair and 
reestablish ambition for nationhood, a goal the new State of Israel would reaffirm and carry 
forward.xv 
 
For all of these individuals history – events – had meaning and it was for Jews to discern 
the divine purpose and their own appropriate response. For them, the course of history could be 
reversed by returning to Torah. 
 
There was another type of Orthodox response – a radical one – that claimed there was no 
meaning to be found in contemporary events, “because the hurban went beyond history and 
because the history that allowed for the hurban proved inherently disastrous.xvi Thus, from the 
midst of the Warsaw Ghetto’s death agonies, while wondering how the world could continue to 
exist after hearing the screams of the victims, Rabbi Kalonymous Kalman Shapiro concluded 
that the atrocities can only be understood as part of an aggadic-cosmic drama between Israel and 
the evil ones.xvii 
 
Similarly in 1947 Simcha Elbert wrote from Shanghai that there is no basis left to 
understand the suffering: “The world has descended [to] the deepest depths [into] the abyss of 
mass murder. . . . There has to be a new six days of creation [which] become possible when 
Torah . . . becomes a light to the nations.” Even so, for Elberg the Akedah of Treblinka – 
exemplified in the victims’ declaration of the Sh’ma “from within the fires that split the heavens” 
– atones for the sins of mankind in general and for Israel’s sin of assimilation in particular. It was 
for that reason that the holiest Jews, those of Poland, were selected – “to intensify the sacrifice 
and thereby enhance the sanctification. . . .”xviii 
 
For Kalonymous Kalman Spira the main consolation for the suffering appears to be the 
recognition that it is a co-suffering with God – a God so infinite suffering infinitely, that God 
must retreat to an inner chamber lest the world explode from the divine suffering. The awareness 
of God’s co-suffering helps the victim transcend his pain.  And  perhaps God will take action 
when not only Jews are attacked, but also Torah.xix Again we find notes of uncertainty. 
 
How more generally have survivors of the Shoah responded to traditional ways of dealing 
with suffering? A detailed survey, done in the late 1970s, of 70 survivors showed that only 11 
percent agreed that in the Holocaust the Jewish people were the sacrifice for humanity’s sins. As 
one survivor said, “God is not unjust and He is not a Christian God who can offer some third 
party, Jesus or the Jews of Europe, to die for the sins of others. . . . there is no vicarious 
atonement in Judaism in a way which would have God sacrifice six million of the innocent for 
the guilty. . . .” Almost none of Judaism’s traditional attempts to explain suffering is to be heard 
from these survivors. A significant 72 percent voiced the opinion that God was not involved at 
all and that the destruction was due entirely to human relationships. In fact, 98 percent of the 
survivors in this study rejected the theory that Jewish martyrdom in the Shoah was the result of 
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divine judgment.xx In conjunction with this conviction, Elie Wiesel insists that the Jewish 
tradition does not “believe that suffering can create or engender anything that transcends it. 
Suffering . . . is a persistent mystery. . . . it would be against tradition to choose suffering.”xxi 
 
Rabbi Albert Friedlander also echoes and reemphasizes this judgment. Any such 
conclusions are misuses of the Holocaust, even if made by victims or survivors of the Shoah. 
They become “a defense for established position; a substitute for religion, and a substitute for 
thinking.” Just as Jews had to reshape their theology after the previous churbans, Jews of today 
must seek for new understanding. After Auschwitz Jewish self-definition rejects “imposed 
concepts” of Jewish destiny “that view Israel as the vicarious atonement, as a lamb of God or a 
suffering messiah figure. The tremendum . . . may never be defined as Jewish destiny.” 
Moreover, “we can never understand Auschwitz (though) we can come to terms with our 
reactions to radical evil.”xxii 
 
Protest as response and Elie Wiesel: 
Where in all of this are we to situate Elie Wiesel’s thoughts and questions? We find that 
he is troubled by the traditional answers and tales particularly as they speak of suffering and 
determine response to it. Thus, in his Messengers of God: Biblical Portraits and Legends, while 
Abraham dared to query God and remonstrate with Him on behalf of others in Sodom and 
Gomorrah, he was silent when God told him to make of his son an ola (a totally burnt offering). 
Why did not Abraham protest on behalf of this innocent son, as well as on behalf of Sarah and 
himself?xxiii 
 
Must we not also wonder about rather than celebrate Abraham’s obedience? By his not 
protesting in this instance, did Abraham consign his people to being perpetual victims? And even 
to their being participants in their own victimization? After all, was it not Abraham’s silence 
before God that led the father in Auschwitz in 1944 on the eve of Rosh Hashanah to conclude not 
only that he was prohibited from ransoming his son from the death barracks (because another 
father’s son would be put there in his place), but also to conclude that it was a merit to offer his 
only son to God as Father Abraham had done?xxiv 
 
And yet ------. Wiesel wonders whether the test of Abraham with Isaac was perhaps a 
“double edged test.” “God subjected Abraham to it, yet at the same time Abraham forced it on 
God. As though Abraham had said, ‘I defy You, Lord. I shall submit to Your will, but let us see 
whether You shall go to the end, whether You shall remain passive and remain silent when the 
life of my son – who is also Your son – is at stake!’ And God changed his mind and relented.” 
And still Abraham didn’t let go of God. He insisted, “I want You to make me the following 
promise that, when, in the future, my children and my children’s children . . . act against Your 
law and against Your will, You will also say nothing and forgive them.” And God agreed. In this 
way, Abraham brought God closer to His creation.xxv 
And what about Isaac and the suffering imposed on him by God’s testing of his father 
and by Abraham’s counter-testing of God? Wiesel finds that it is Isaac’s privilege to “remain 
Israel’s Melitz-Yosher, the defender of his people, pleading its cause . . . . entitled to say anything 
to God, ask anything of Him. Because he suffered? No. Wiesel says, Suffering in Jewish 
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tradition, confers no privileges. It all depends on what one makes of that suffering. Isaac knew 
how to transform it into prayer and love rather than rancor and malediction.”xxvi 
 
André Neher has gone a step beyond Wiesel and raised still another question: What about 
Sarah, Isaac’s mother, the person left behind, ignorant (as far as we know) of the command given 
to her husband by the Lord? Would she have acquiesced as he did? Or would she have protested? 
She was given neither alternative. And, according to the Midrash, because of being left in 
ignorance, Satan was thereby enabled to tell her a lie: that Abraham had sacrificed their son 
Isaac. In this way Satan brought about her fatal collapse for she could not survive Isaac “without 
betraying him.”xxvii 
 
Wiesel also challenges Job: Why did he not carry his protest, his accusations against God, 
to the end? Why did he suddenly give in? Wiesel points out that Job’s “resignation as a man was 
an insult to man. . . . He should have continued to protest. . . .xxviii  In fact, Wiesel prefers to 
think that the “true ending [of the book of Job] was lost. That Job died without having repented, 
without having humiliated himself.” If this is not the case, then “Job’s resignation as a man was 
an insult to man. . . . He should have continued to protest. . . . He should have said to God: Very 
well, I forgive You, . . . to the extent of my sorrow. . . . But what about my dead children, do 
they forgive You? What right have I to speak on their behalf?” Job should have recognized that 
his “‘restitution’ was worthless next to his previous suffering. . . .”xxix In Night Wiesel wrote 
about how he sympathized with Job. He doubted God’s absolute justice.xxx 
 
The need to protest is one of Wiesel’s major themes: protest against human injustice and 
protest against divine injustice. For Elie Wiesel, failure to protest is a failure to be involved in 
the divine-human drama; it is a renunciation of responsibility, and thus it enables evil and 
suffering to prevail. He cites a Jewish legend in which God points out that the difference 
between a group of pure and a group of impure people is that the pure ones had protested. God 
says that the others should have protested: “against Me, against Man, against everything wrong. 
Because protest in itself contains a spark of truth, a spark of holiness, a spark of God.”xxxi 
 
Does protest affect divinity? Wiesel has wrestled with that question most particularly in 
his cantata Ani Maamin: A Song Lost and Found Again.xxxii  Insert n. 29 and get info =date & 
publ.  
 
Though Wiesel remains within the tradition, he also pushes the tradition into confronting 
the revolutionary differences with which it was faced in the years of the Third Reich and which it 
cannot ignore even now since the precedent of attempted total annihilation of the Jewish people 
has been set. André Neher insists that Night is Wiesel’s rewriting of the Akedah “in the light of 
the Night of Auschwitz. . . . the story of the Akedah is suddenly singed . . . with the fires of 
reality.” Thus Night is “an exorcism of the Bible through the challenge of the real.” And 
Wiesel’s protests and reworking of the Bible stories are a serious and existential attempt to make 
biblical faith face that ultimate test.xxxiii In this way Elie Wiesel sees Isaac as the first survivor. A 
survivor who taught his people, “the future survivors of Jewish history, that it is possible to 
suffer and despair an entire lifetime and still not give up the art of laughter. Isaac. . . never freed 
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himself from the traumatizing scenes that violated his youth; the holocaust that had marked him 
and continued to haunt him forever. Yet he remained capable of laughter.”xxxiv 
 
The precedent of the Shoah requires not only protest to and against God and against any 
social injustice, but it also requires that the Jewish people not ignore the consequences of 
powerlessness and the decimation it has brought on them. So Wiesel is convinced that the Jewish 
people could not survive today physically or spiritually without the State of Israel. “Israel is the 
cornerstone, the backbone of Jewish existence everywhere.”xxxv 
 
Responses to Shoah Suffering – Christian: 
How do Christians speak of suffering after the Shoah? Have their thoughts and words 
been changed at all by that cataclysm in history and human relations? Do they feel any need to 
change them? Or do they assume that their theology has said the final words on the subject based 
on their inherited understanding of Jesus’ death? 
 
Most books of Christian theology (especially outside the West, but also in the West) still 
are written and read, and most sermons are preached as if the slaughter of six million Jewish 
individuals had never occurred, and certainly as if it is not relevant for Christian thought. Those 
mainline theologians who do mention the Holocaust are apt to find a nice little niche for it and 
then surround it with basically the same theology that could have been written before 1933 or 
1939.xxxvi On the basis of the theologically rooted conviction that Christ’s experience on the 
cross encompasses (and even exceeds) all human agony whenever and wherever it occurs, 
theological constructs do not have to be altered in order to take something new into account for 
nothing new matters. For such Christians, the best that can be done with Auschwitz is to identify 
it as the Golgotha of the Jewish people in the 20th century without considering whether there are 
any significant differences in that Golgotha and the original one, or without wondering whether 
Auschwitz has something to say to themselves about how the church has been interpreting 
Golgotha all the intervening centuries. 
 
Yet the Holocaust requires a recognition that a rupture in history occurred that cannot be 
set aside. Fortunately, there are Christians who recognize this and the radical challenge with 
which it faces the church. To cite just two of them: The German Catholic Johannes Baptist Metz 
is insistent that Christianity cannot do theology with its back toward Auschwitz; and once facing 
Auschwitz it must realize that Christian theology in its entirety must be revised. “We will have to 
forego the temptation to interpret the suffering of the Jewish people from our standpoint in terms 
of saving history. Under no circumstances is it our task to mystify this suffering.” xxxvii 
 
The American Protestant Robert McAfee Brown agrees: “No theodicy can encompass 
this event so that its wounds are closed, its scars healed. The event forever precludes easy faith in 
God or faith in humanity. . . . Neither faith, I believe, can confront the Holocaust without in some 
ways being transformed.”xxxviii 
 
If one were to identify Auschwitz with Golgotha, what could the redemptive purpose of 
six million deaths be? The American Catholic Eugene Fisher has dared to suggest that, since 
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“Jesus’ death is a divine gift bringing all humanity closer to God’s love, [and since the] sense of 
hope amidst despair is true because of the death of [that] one Jew long ago, . . . might it not be 
also true, and much more so, of the deaths of six million Jewish women, men and children  
. . . .?”xxxix  However I must raise a question: If in the Christian scheme, Christ has already made 
redemption available to all humanity, what else can six million “crucifixions” accomplish? Pope 
John Paul II and John Cardinal O’Connor have attempted to grapple with that question. 
 
Addressing the Jews of Warsaw on June 14, 1987, the Pope confessed, “We believe in 
the purifying power of suffering. The more atrocious the suffering, the greater the purification. 
The more painful the experiences, the greater the hope . . . . You have become the saving 
warning . . . . you continue your particular vocation, showing yourselves to be still the heirs of 
that election to which God is faithful. This is to be your mission in the contemporary world . . . .” 
And on June 24, 1988, speaking to the Jewish community in Vienna, the Pope observed that 
“faith teaches us that God never forsakes those who suffer persecution but reveals himself to 
them and enlightens through them all people on the road to salvation.”xl 
 
Cardinal O’Connor confesses that he approaches the agonizing question of the Holocaust 
within the context of his and Archbishop Cushing’s theology of suffering. He is convinced that 
“the crucifixion and its enormous power continue mystically and will continue until the end of 
time. Christ . . . continues to suffer in His Body, the Church (and through the Church in all 
people) . . . quite, quite really. And this suffering has a purpose and an effect [on other persons 
elsewhere in the world], as does ours if we cojoin it with His, if we ‘offer it up.’” Because of its 
effect (namely,  the “salvation of souls”), it is a gift to the world. Consequently, “if the suffering 
of the crucifixion was infinitely redemptive, the suffering of the Holocaust, potentially cojoined 
with it, is incalculably redemptive.”xli 
 
Two questions clamor to be heard: First, how is Jewish suffering in the Shoah to be 
cojoined to Christ’s on the cross? Can the suffering of those now dead fifty or more years be 
offered up by someone else on their behalf? And what if it was not then (or is not now) offered 
up? We know that numbers of Jews went to their deaths affirming their trust in God – “offering 
up” their lives, kiveyachol. Yet almost certainly a larger number of the victims would not have 
done so given the circumstances under which they perished, or would not even have been in a 
condition to do so, and certainly not with the name of Christ on their lips. Is their suffering then 
non-redemptive and hence meaningless? Clearly for these Catholic churchmen the suffering of 
the Jewish victims can only be interpreted – and hopefully redeemed – within Christian concepts 
of saving history. But using Metz’s dictum, we must ask whether the Cardinal’s back – and the 
Pope’s – are not turned to Auschwitz even though they think they are facing it. 
Second, are Christians such as O’Connor and John Paul II asking Jews of today to offer 
up their own pain (as survivors, relatives or victims, or even as part of the Jewish community 
which is the “accidental remnant” and thus vicarious sufferers of Hitler’s obsessive hatred)? 
Does this mean their having to be accepting of that pain because of its having a possible positive 
effect somewhere in the world? Can such victims believe that? Is asking for such a response not 
further burdening those already victimized or intended for victimization? 
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One cannot deny anyone his ultimate faith (just as we do not deny that of the various 
Jewish Orthodox with whom we may not concur). But one can challenge the ethical and practical 
consequences of its public affirmation. Would it not be more appropriate for such churchmen to 
urge their own community to take on (in whatever ways are possible) the pain of the victims and 
survivors and vicariously bear that pain as fellow sufferers? Not in order to “offer it up,” which 
would be presumptuous, but simply to help alleviate it for the people of suffering by sharing it. 
 
When Elie Wiesel and his fellow inmates watched the slow and agonizing death of a 
young boy on the gallows at Buna, he heard a fellow prisoner ask, “Where is God?” And again, a 
half hour later as the boy still lingered between life and death, “Where is God now?” And a voice 
within Wiesel answered: “Here He is – He is hanging here on this gallows. . . .”xlii André Neher 
sees this passage as “a strange evocation of the Passion [of Jesus – but] with the difference, deep 
as an abyss, that it was not, however, God who was hanging on the cross but an innocent little 
Jewish child, and that after three days he was not to rise again.”xliii 
 
Other questions are raised by the theology of suffering. 
 
Does the concept of vicarious suffering really function so that one or more person’s 
suffering really atones for the sins of others, as both Christianity and Judaism have affirmed? 
Wiesel insists that if we say the suffering was not in vain (as Pope John Paul II and Cardinal 
O’Connor say), it may sound as if “we are justifying it [whereas] the life and death of a single 
child is more important than all the answers. But at the same time, it would be just as awful to 
say that the suffering had been in vain. . . .” Why? Because there would be no connection 
between the suffering and death of the Holocaust time and the “burst of humanity” after the 
Holocaust. When Philippe de Saint-Cheron pushed Wiesel further and asked again: Does 
suffering count, does it have a positive impact? (as François Mauriac also asserts). Wiesel 
admitted to having opposite feelings. At times he tells himself “all suffering will count, and since 
God exists, nothing can be lost.” But at other times he cannot believe that as “all [that] pain and 
suffering and misery” are just too much!xliv As he had written years before, “If God needs human 
suffering to be God, how can man foresee an end to that suffering?”xlv 
 
Protest as Christian response: 
In considerable contrast to the Christian affirmation of suffering’s positive role is the 
rediscovery, in some Christian circles, of the Jewish model of faith as a dialectic of trust and 
questioning (hutzpah k’lapei shamaya).xlvi The absence in Christian tradition of prayer of 
lament, of “daring prayer,” of outbursts against God, is seen to have stripped the faith of 
“eschatological tension and too readily [have] drawn [it] to an easy theodicy.” We need to see 
that the renewed interest in arguing with God is the result of several factors: Christian grappling 
with the Holocaust and other enormities of suffering in the 20th and 21st  centuries, exposure to 
the writings of Elie Wiesel and discovery of the Hasidic tradition, sensitivity to unremitting 
suffering as liberation theologians exhort us, and a new emphasis within Christian theology on 
the suffering/passion of the Creator-God.  Darrell Fasching insists that the world “can no longer 
afford the luxury of unquestioning faith. . . . All faith that asks for a total surrender of will is, 
finally, . . . demonic. . . . For all such faith is a training ground in fanaticism. . . . The only 
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authentic faith is a questioning faith, a faith prepared to call even God into question.”xlvii   
 
Roy Eckardt invokes Judaism’s tradition of protest, and God’s own standards of justice, 
to enter an indictment against God, “from the side of the Jewish people.” Why?  Because “God 
is responsible for having created a world in which man is free to make history” – specifically, 
free to make the Shoah; for having inflicted (or having allowed the infliction of) his children. 
Even so, Eckardt adds, it is, or may be, still possible for us to forgive God, for God originated 
forgiveness. xlviii     
 
In response to the terrible sufferings of the 20th century Ronald Goetz, another American, 
also challenges Christianity’s traditional effort to take God “off the hook for creating so brutal a 
world” by contending that it was humans who introduced suffering and death into the world, and 
thus it was “not the ontological precondition of existence.” But Goetz says we can no longer 
evade the Creator’s responsibility. “What [then] is revealed about the Father’s nature and love in 
his resolute determination to slay the son?” Goetz finds that he must conclude that “Jesus 
Christ’s death entails not just God’s atonement for our sins but God’s own atonement for being 
the ultimate agent of evil as well as good.” Thus the only way Goetz can affirm the “ultimate 
trustworthiness of God in the face of the ‘woe’ that God has created” is by seeing “God suffering 
with us, suffering at our hands as we suffer at God’s own hands. . . .”xlix 
 
Against finding meaning in unmerited suffering: 
Lawrence Langer contends that in the circumstances of the death camps the very word 
suffering is inappropriate; atrocity is more correct. “The Nazi evil not only subverted good as we 
know it; the forms it took poisoned the possibility of a redemptive suffering. . . .”l  
 
In such extremity Terrence Des Pres insists that death can never be a victory. “The luxury 
of sacrifice – the strategic choice of death to resolve irreconcilable moral conflicts – is 
meaningless in a world where any person’s death only contributes to the success of evil.”li 
 
These two Americans (Jewish and Christian) point up the danger in all efforts to find 
meaning in unmerited suffering – not just that of the Holocaust. The questions this raises are: 
How much of the effort to give suffering a purifying or redemptive power is a result of our not 
knowing how else to cope with it? Trying to provide ourselves with reassurance that pain is not 
meaningless and that evil will not have the last word? And how much of the commendation of 
the meek and powerless is a result of our fearing the upset of the status quo, of change? 
Instead of speaking about rediscovering the capacity to suffer, or about God’s 
indebtedness to his people for allowing divine forbearance with human sin to persist, would we 
not be better advised to listen to the witness and warning of some additional spokespeople today 
– among the poor and tortured, Blacks, women, Hispanics? As William Jones insists “Any 
theodicy that makes blacks “God’s contemporary suffering servant has to be rejected [as] any 
theodicy that breeds quietism thereby sustains oppression. . . . A morally viable and defensible 
theodycy [must] become the foundation of a moral commitment to human liberation from the 
plague of unjust suffering. This is the only road along which the divine righteousness can be 
saved, sustained, and honored.”lii 
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Along with survivors of death camps these victims of oppression insist that suffering 
does not ennoble, does not provide moral stature or spiritual depth or refined sensibility. It does 
not make a person superior or more authentic than a non-sufferer. As long as we try to comfort 
ourselves or others with ideas about the positive effects of suffering – including a redemptive 
function – the less we will be inclined to reject it as the evil it is, and the less we may be inclined 
to fight against it. 
 
God’s pathos/suffering: 
If we recognize that suffering is not part of God’s will or wish for the creation – that it is, 
in fact, the reverse of what God intended – then all attempts to find God’s beneficent action in 
any event involving suffering are incoherent with the divine will. Furthermore, if we find that 
God suffers because of the pain inflicted on God’s human children, then God’s suffering along 
with them may even represent the continual threat of destruction and dissolution that faces both 
humankind and God.liii 
 
Christiaan Beker is persuaded that the “Holocaust and all other holocausts which 
followed in its train or preceded it . . . have rendered all our previous explanations of suffering 
either obsolete or insufficient.”liv And Lawrence Langer reminds us that death camp survivors 
attest to the “utter irreconcilability” of their experience with any “prior consoling system of 
values.” For the atrocities they beheld or endured were beyond suffering, as they were beyond the 
framework of conventional theodicy.”lv So the ineradicable problem of suffering, especially after 
the Shoah, must remain an unanswered question, forever troubling us, so that we will not seek to 
justify it or cease fighting against it. 
 
------------------------- 
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